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The following is adapted from a keynote address delivered by Dr. 
Ellen Rose to the 2017 Atlantic Education Graduate Student 
Conference at the University of New Brunswick.  
 
I’m pleased to be here today as your keynote speaker, and want to 
begin by thanking the conference organizers for giving me the 
opportunity and honour of helping to kick off this important event.  
 
My topic today is truth—and, in particular, what it means to be a 
researcher in an era that is described as “post-truth.” Truth, of 
course, bears an intrinsic connection to research, in that how we 
think about what truth is and how (or even whether) it can be 
discovered shape how we think about the nature and purpose of 
research; and this connection between truth and research is 
amplified for educational researchers, who are particularly 
concerned with the nature of knowing and learning. Given this 
profound connection, I believe it’s imperative that we come to 
terms with the implications of the fairly new phenomenon of “post-
truth.” So, in the next 20 minutes or so, I will talk about what truth 
means, explore the relationship between truth and research, and 
discuss what the emergence of a post-truth society might mean for 
you as graduate researchers. 
 
Truth has, in fact, been a topic of discussion for millennia. I’m not 
a philosopher, and I don’t pretend to understand the complexities 
of this long-standing dialogue, nor do I have the time to do more 
than fast-forward through it, greatly oversimplifying as I pause for a 
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few seconds at some of what seem to me to be the more important 
moments.  
 
What quickly becomes clear is that there is no agreed-upon truth 
about truth. The Greek philosophers regarded truth as the 
correspondence between ideas or language and an external reality; 
and working from this conception of truth, Plato, Aristotle, and 
others sought to identify what they believed to be universal truths. 
While Aristotle believed that we could discover these truths 
through sensory experiences, such as observation and experiment, 
René Descartes argued, in the 1600s, that truth and knowledge are 
discoverable through pure reason, independent of sensory 
evidence. Cartesian science was challenged a century later by 
Giambattista Vico, who insisted that we can only have insight into 
the truths we have constructed; and these human-made truths are 
available not through reasoning or sensory experience but what he 
called “poetic wisdom,” a combination of imaginative thinking and 
rhetoric, that uncovers new ways of looking at things.  
 
Despite their very different ideas about truth, these and other 
thinkers shared a common foundational premise: that there are 
universal truths that can be discovered by human beings. But this 
premise did not go unchallenged. For example, in the 1800s, 
Friedrich Nietzsche not only contended that there are no universal 
truths but also rejected the possibility of an objective, truth-seeking 
self. Nietzsche argued that all human thought is tied up with 
subjectivity; therefore, rather than a single truth, there are multiple 
truths, because each of us, with our different bodies, experiences, 
passions, sociocultural positions, and so forth, sees the world 
differently, and what’s more, our perspectives are constantly 
changing. But Nietzsche went even further, arguing that what we 
understand to be true at any given time is always a function of 
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power—the power of some people to dominate how others think 
about and perceive the world. In other words, declarations of 
truth—to give a very contemporary example, competing views of 
climate change—are always motivated by a “will to power.” He 
wasn’t talking about political power, although it can certainly take 
this form, but about a general life force—in fact, a creative force—
that compels human beings to assert themselves and their interests. 
 
It’s not a great stretch to move from Nietzsche’s fundamental 
skepticism toward truth claims to the “post” ways of thinking that 
arose in the 1960s: post-modernism, post-structuralism, post-
colonialism. Led by such thinkers as Jacques Derrida and Michel 
Foucault, scholars, researchers, and philosophers in these camps 
generally share a view of truth as highly subjective and continually 
negotiated. They strive to illuminate how ideas become 
constructed and accepted as indisputable truths, and they advocate 
and enact, in their work, a fundamental skepticism toward truths, 
or what Jean Lyotard called “metanarratives.” In fact, one of the 
main targets of postmodern thinkers is the purported objectivity 
and neutrality of science. Postmodernists argue that, like all 
knowledge, scientific knowledge is constructed, and therefore is 
necessarily shaped by the researchers’ personal interests and 
agendas as well as by paradigms of thought which periodically arise 
to displace old “truths.” 
 
Even after this whirlwind tour of changing perspectives about truth 
and knowledge, I think it’s quite clear that these diverse views have 
strong implications for how people conceptualize the purpose and 
nature of research. Does research entail empirical investigation, 
methodological reasoning, imaginative inquiry, or gaining insight 
into diverse individual perspectives? Is its purpose to seek an 
absolute, independent truth; to embrace multiple, socially 
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constructed truths; or to reveal and challenge the will to power 
inherent in all assertions of truth? In fact, today, it can be all of 
these things and more: fascinatingly, these contradictions co-exist 
within contemporary research discourses and practices, making 
this a rather interesting time to be a researcher. 
 
But we’ve all heard the expression, often represented as an ancient 
Chinese curse, “may you live in interesting times.” These are 
interesting times indeed for researchers, because we now find 
ourselves facing a new attitude to truth and knowledge that has 
been labelled “post-truth.” As defined by the Oxford dictionary, 
which declared “post-truth” to be the word of the year in 2016, the 
term describes “circumstances in which objective facts are less 
influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and 
personal belief.” The Oxford dictionary adds that the prefix “post” 
denotes “belonging to a time in which the specified concept [in this 
case, truth] has become unimportant or irrelevant.”  
 
We’ve seen that truth has been under attack for some time, but 
that doesn’t mean that we can simply draw a direct line of 
continuity from post-modernism, and other posts that skeptically 
challenge truth claims, to post-truth. While the latter term has 
been around since at least the early 2000s, the spike in its usage 
during the United Kingdom’s European Union referendum and 
the last US presidential election—and its use in the term “post-truth 
politics”—suggests that its source lies, at least in part, in a growing 
disaffection with political regimes that are supposed to represent 
the interests of their constituents but which are increasingly 
perceived as self-serving, elitist, and dishonest. During both Brexit 
and the Trump campaign, the public witnessed time and again 
politicians denying evidence, as well as making use of data and 
research findings in manipulative ways that served their own 
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agendas. As distrust in the “facts” offered up by the establishment 
grows, we move toward a post-truth reality in which truth is less 
important in shaping public opinion than attitude and belief. 
 
Perhaps, like me, you watched in growing disbelief last year, as—
even as he was caught time after time in blatant lies, or “alternative 
facts”—Donald Trump’s popularity soared. That’s because, for 
many Americans, as it seems for Trump himself, truth, fact, and 
evidence had clearly become irrelevant. In fact, to really 
understand post-truth, you have to understand that Trump’s very 
disregard of truth was a large part of his appeal for thousands of 
Americans who felt that scholarly and scientific knowledge were 
tools that a wealthy elite use to manipulate, disenfranchise, and 
silence them. Trump’s words may have played fast and loose with 
the truth, but they were exactly what a disaffected populace wanted 
to hear. Because in the era of post-truth, emotional resonance 
becomes much more important than evidence. As Trump’s 
daughter Ivanka tellingly wrote in her book, The Trump Card: 
Playing to Win in Work and in Life (2010), “If someone perceives 
something to be true, it is more important than if it is in fact true.” 
 
While post-truth is in part a product of political disaffection, it also 
undoubtedly has something to do with the Internet, which, in 
placing endless data at our fingertips, makes serious inroads into 
previously held monopolies of knowledge and truth. Academic 
journals, encyclopedias, and other peer-reviewed sources now 
contend with blogs and Wikipedia, diluting the concept of 
expertise, making it hard to distinguish between information and 
misinformation, real news and “fake news,” and making it easy, as 
the Oxford dictionary says, “to cherry-pick data and come to 
whatever conclusion you desire.” The situation is amplified by a 
phenomenon called “the echo chamber effect.” The idea is that, as 
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people increasingly seek information online, they tend to turn 
repeatedly to information sources—for example, particular online 
social communities—that “echo” or reinforce their own beliefs, 
while misrepresenting or omitting other perspectives, and that thus 
make their own opinions seem more widely accepted than they 
really are.  
 
An interesting example of post-truth in action is the controversy 
over vaccinations. The controversy arose with the 1998 publication 
in The Lancet of a paper by Andrew Wakefield and 12 colleagues, 
who claimed that there was a link between autism and the 
combined vaccine for measles, mumps, and rubella. Within a few 
years, Wakefield had been totally discredited: it was shown that he 
had manipulated his findings and that he had some serious 
undeclared conflicts of interest, including a patent submitted for an 
alternative vaccine. By 2010, the editor of The Lancet had come 
out with a complete retraction of the paper, describing it as “utterly 
false”—but by then it was too late. Thanks to widespread and often 
highly emotional coverage in the press and social media, the 
connection between the vaccine and autism had become widely 
accepted, and efforts to debunk it actually tended to exacerbate the 
hold the story had on the popular imagination by pitting scientific 
evidence against people’s personal experiences and emotions. For 
example, model Jenny McCarthy, whose son Evan is autistic, is an 
outspoken and passionate advocate of Wakefield’s views. 
McCarthy has countered the evidence of researchers, published in 
prestigious scholarly venues such as the British Medical Journal, 
with the appeal to emotion over reason that is the hallmark of the 
post-truth era: “My science is named Evan,” she asserted in an 
appearance on Oprah, “and he’s at home. That’s my science.” 
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I’ve suggested that, over the centuries, changing ideas about the 
nature of truth have actually enriched the palette of possibilities for 
researchers. But what are the consequences of post-truth for 
research? The vaccination controversy is an interesting example 
because it shows how, in a post-truth era, falsified research can 
assume the mantle of truth. But perhaps even more concerning is 
that, in a post-truth era, defined as a time in which truth becomes 
essentially what people want to believe, regardless of evidence, the 
opposite can also happen: that is, a researcher can do everything in 
his or her power to ensure that his or her research results are 
trustworthy—and find that the results are still not accepted as true, 
or are somehow misrepresented or misused. This, of course, has 
strong implications for researchers, including all of us here, so I 
want to spend the last few minutes of this talk sharing with you 
what I believe to be four of the most important implications. 
 
First, it’s important to recognize that all research is political. 
Research findings relate in powerful ways to people’s lives—to their 
health, their social well-being, the ways in which they are governed; 
and those findings do go out into the world, where they may be 
used in unanticipated ways: to sway opinion, to create policy, to 
shape practice, and so forth. I would suggest that, as researchers in 
a post-truth era, we need to become more aware of the politics of 
knowledge. Indeed, I would even go so far as to say that we have 
an ethical responsibility to think about how our research might be 
used and to conduct and present our research in a way that 
minimizes the possibility of misuse—for example, to be cautious 
about claiming a greater degree of certainty or generalizability than 
the findings warrant.  
 
Second, I would advocate that we begin to think differently about 
what it means to ensure that one’s research is trustworthy. 
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Typically, considerations of the trustworthiness of research are 
framed within the terms of validity and reliability: we ask questions 
such as, Does the data collection instrument measure what it is 
meant to measure? Has the data been triangulated? In attending 
scrupulously to such issues, the researcher ensures that the 
academic community will accept the research findings. However, if 
we as researchers in an era of post-truth are interested in having 
our findings speak to a wider public—and we should be—then we 
need to begin also asking different kinds of questions, such as, 
Who will benefit from this research? Whose life might be 
diminished? And how is this research likely to be interpreted and 
received by different stakeholder groups?  
 
This leads to the third implication. Such questions can be 
answered more easily if we open up the research process to 
dialogues with stakeholders, particularly those who feel 
marginalized and unheard. We need to listen carefully and try to 
understand why individuals, groups, organizations, and 
communities hold the positions they do, and how they might 
receive and be affected by our research findings. But, equally 
important, ongoing dialogue and engagement with stakeholders 
can help to alter the positioning of the research itself from a 
perceived elitist practice, in which inquiries are done to 
participants, to a democratic practice enacted with stakeholders, 
whose differences of perspective are acknowledged and valued. In 
fact, I would advocate that we strive to make this dialogue a 
fundamental part of the research process and that we share the 
insights it provides in publications and presentations about the 
research.  
 
Which leads to my final implication: that, when it comes to 
communicating our research findings, we acknowledge our role as 
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storytellers. It seems to me that, as we follow the standard formats 
for academic writing—for example, the well-known literature 
review-methodology-findings-conclusions format—we lose sight of 
our role as makers of narrative. But, as Neil Postman (1999) 
insists, the “truthfulness” of research resides not in its validity or 
reliability but in its ability to offer people a useful narrative—that is, 
a story with explanatory power that also gives meaning and 
purpose to their lives—and that’s particularly the case in the era of 
post-truth, when resonance increasingly takes precedence over 
evidence as the touchstone of truthfulness. But it is also important 
that, like all stories, each narrative be offered not as the final word, 
not as the truth, but as a partial rendering of the messy reality of 
teaching and learning, opening up a new perspective, offering a 
new lens. 
 
In short, I’m suggesting that, rather than regarding post-truth as 
diminishing our research efforts, we seize the challenge and 
opportunity that the post-truth era offers to reimagine the nature 
and purpose of research. And I’ll conclude by adding that no one 
is in a better position to lead the way in that effort than you, 
graduate researchers beginning your research careers, poised to 
become “creative, critical…intellectual risk-takers” (Scholz & 
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